--- title: "How DGA-based botnet works?" slug: "how-dga-based-botnet-works" tags: ["Product Usage", "IPS 10.1.10"] updated: 2026-10-05T15:41:16Z published: 2026-10-05T15:41:16Z canonical: "docs.trellix.com/how-dga-based-botnet-works" --- > ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.trellix.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # How DGA-based botnet works? For a botnet to be active, the bots must be able to communicate with the C&C server. For example, bots transfer the results of previous operations as well as seek further instructions. As a counter-measure, security applications find ways to break this communication channel between the bots and the C&C server. One of the ways of breaking a botnet is to identify the IP addresses and domains of C&C servers based on signatures to block them, or use a central reputation system to identify known C&C server domains and IP addresses. So, for a botnet, it is critical that the C&C server details are concealed so that they are highly available for the bots and avoid any legal action. Some hackers use DGA to keep the C&C infrastructure concealed but available to the bots. DGA uses a seed, such as date or time, and generates random C&C server domain names. The bot contacts the local name server to resolve these domain names. DGA generates a high number of such domain names over a short period. The attacker registers one of the random domain names generated by the DGA. So, the bot is now able to access the C&C server. Attackers register DGA domains for short periods. This just-in-time registration makes it difficult for security applications and reputation systems to block the domain. DGA traffic from a bot ![](https://cdn.us.document360.io/0d453a50-e1da-4d4a-9409-fea7959614d8/Images/Documentation/GUID-426DC53D-A76A-4935-8AFA-AC9570581604-low(1).png?sv=2026-02-06&spr=https&st=2026-11-20T03%3A05%3A02Z&se=2026-11-20T04%3A05%3A02Z&sr=c&sp=r&sig=MSA70u%2FmrhwLdDuww%2BLnuSaYulp%2Fi6rmQw9kzgmf3i4%3D) Malware might use DGA as the primary or secondary method to contact the C&C domain. For example, some malware such as Conficker use DGA as the mechanism to contact its C&C domain. Some Zeus variants employ DGA as a secondary mechanism. That is, the DGA code is triggered only when a bot is unable to reach the hardcoded C&C domains.